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WHEN THE LIGHTER "FADES AWAY,"* WHO PAYS?
A PROBLEM IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF MARITIME RISKt
THE terms of bills of lading given for shipment of goods by sea between
ports of the United States and foreign ports are governed by two statutes:
the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA),' which applies during the
period while the goods are on the ocean-going vessel (from tackle to tackle) ;2
and the Harter Act,3 which, except while the goods are aboard the vessel,
governs the entire period of carrier custody of the goods-a period defined
as ending once a "proper delivery" has been made.4 Carriers, probably seek-
ing the benefit of COGSA's positive exculpation for all but negligently caused
damages, frequently use uniform bills which stipulate that COGSA shall apply
throughout their entire custody of the goods, including the period governed
by Harter.5 In addition, carriers attempt to prevent completely Harter's ap-
plication by stipulating that "proper delivery" will occur as soon as the goods
are released from the ship's tacldes." And they more specifically seek to ex-
culpate themselves from liability for damage during lighterage, 7 even when
no notice of the lighterage arrangements is given the shipper and, in fact, the
lighterage is entirely under carrier control.8
The validity of contractual allocations of these delivery risks to the shipper
has been questioned, most recently in Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Ex-
*When a lighter sinks in calm sea without apparent reason, she is said, in the pic-
turesque phrase of the waterfront, to have faded away. The Jugshoved, 290 Fed. 733, 735
(1923).
tCaterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 210 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
rev'd, 318 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 347 (1963).
1. 49 Stat. 1207-13 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-13 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as
"COGSA" with section number).
2. COGSA § 7.
3. 27 Stat. 445-46 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1958) (hereinafter referred to as
"Harter" with section number).
4. Harter § 1.
5. See, e.g., Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d (1961),
aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962) ; Mackey v. United States (The Yoro),
83 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1952).
6. This is attempted variously by clauses purporting to excuse negligence in lighter-
age [see, e.g., The Portuguese Prince, 209 Fed. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)] or, more recently,
by direct stipulation [see, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, 113 F. Supp.
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)].
7. "Lighterage," as used here, refers to the transportation. of goods by small craft
from an ocean-going vessel to the wharf in a port where the shallowness of the harbor
forbids docking by the vessels themselves.
8. Such clauses are found in almost all ocean, bills of lading and are generally con-
strued to excuse the carrier only when he has not been negligent. See, e.g., The Ogeechee,
248 Fed. 803 (E.D. Pa. 1918); North Amer. Smelting Co. v. Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d
384 (3d Cir. 1953). But cf. Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d
486 (1961), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962).
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peditor.9 The American Export Lines' S.S. Expeditor had taken on two trac-
tors consigned by the shipper, Caterpillar Overseas, for delivery in Tripoli.
Because of the shallowness of the harbor, the Expeditor was required to un-
load onto a lighter, which American Export had hired without notice to either
the shipper or consignee. After the tractors had been chocked in place on the
lighter, it careened. The tractors slid into the water, and suffered severe dam-
age. Caterpillar sued American Export in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York. Clauses in the bill of lading incorporated all the carrier-
favored stipulations concerning the period during which COGSA would apply
and when proper delivery would be held to occur. 10 The District Court found
that the stipulation that delivery take place when the goods were discharged
from the ship was effective to render the delivery to the lighter a proper
delivery, so that Harter no longer applied. American Export was, under this
view, contractually exonerated, even if it had been negligent." The Second
Circuit, which reversed, voided the stipulations for proper delivery and light-
erage responsibility, but applied without discussion, under the stipulation for
COGSA, section 4(2) (q) of that act, which renders the carrier liable only
for negligence.' 2 The carrier was held liable, under this stipulated provision,
for its failure to sustain the burden of showing that it had exercised due
diligence to provide a seaworthy lighter.13 This decision raises interesting
problems of the permissible scope of contract initiative available to carriers
and shippers operating under COGSA and Harter.
Under the common law, the carrier was absolutely liable, until proper de-
livery was made, for all damage to goods consigned to his care unless the
damage was due to a rather limited group of causes generally known as force
mnajeure and the carrier took proper precautions to avoid such damage.14
"Proper delivery" was usually effected by delivery to a fit wharf.' 5 To lessen
their liability, carriers began to place exculpatory clauses in bills of lading,
sometimes to relieve themselves of strict liability but often purporting to ex-
cuse even negligence. By late in the nineteenth century, such clauses had be-
9. 210 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), rev'd, 318 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 84
Sup. Ct. 347 (1963). The statement of facts is based on the Court of Appeals' opinion.
10. See Clauses 1, 4 and 12, American Export Lines, Inc. Standard Bill of Lading,
Appendix to Brief for Respondent, Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. v. S.S. Expeditor, 318
F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1963) (hereinafter referred to as "American Export Bill of Lading").
11. 210 F. Supp. at 480.
12. 318 F.2d at 724.
13. The Court of Appeals found that the careening of the lighter in a calm sea raised
a presumption of unseaworthiness, citing Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank
Barge Corp., 314 U.S. 107, 111-12 (1941). 318 F2 at 725. It also held that the carrier
was unable to demonstrate due diligence in attempting to provide a seaworthy lighter
and, impliedly, that any finding to the contrary would be "clearly erroneous" and hence
could be reversed, implicitly relying upon McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20-21
(1954). 318 F.2d at 725.
14. The Propeller Niagara v. Cordes, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 7, 23 (1858).
15. See The Eddy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 481, 495 (1866). There were other means of
making proper delivery, but they were generally functional equivalents of wharf delivery.
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come standard components of contracts for the carriage of goods by sea.16 In
Liverpool & Great Western S.S. Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co.,17 decided in 1889,
the Supreme Court found shippers unable to "higgle or stand out" when car-
riers proposed bills of lading containing exculpatory language; it held that
the shippers would be afforded protection by the judiciary; no maritime com-
mon carrier would be allowed to exculpate himself from the consequences of
his own negligence or that of his servants.' 8
In 1893, Congress passed the Harter Act, which enacted in statutory form
most of the doctrine enunciated in Liverpool & Great Western, and rested
upon the same theory of adhesion in carrier-shipper contracts. 19 With one
exception,20 Harter does not enact positive law, but states only that the car-
rier may not exculpate itself from certain risks in its bill of lading.21 Thus,
the carrier cannot enforce any contract clause relieving him of the obligations
to use due diligence to furnish a seaworthy vessel, including a proper master
and crew, and to exercise proper care in loading, stowing, preserving, and
delivering the cargo.2 2 On the other hand, the statute does not apply to clauses
that exculpate the carrier from his common-law liability for damage not caused
by negligence,m and such clauses are almost invariably included in modern
bills.
16. See Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. REsv. 157, 159 (1903).
17. 129 U.S. 397 (1889).
18. Id. at 439-41.
19. See The Delaware, 161 U.S. 459 (1896); Koppers Conn. Coke Co. v. James
McWilliams Blue Line, Inc., 89 F.2d 865, 866 (2d Cir. 1937) ; The Willdomino, 300 Fed.
5 (3d Cir. 1924); Tan Hi v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 432, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1950);
Green, The Harter Act, 16 HARV. L. REv. 157, 159 (1903) ; other evidence of this anti-
carrier spirit may be found in the policy of construing the terms of the Act strictly
against the carrier. See The Newport, 7 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1925). See also May v.
Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft (The Isis), 290 U.S. 333 (1933) ;
Smith v. Booth, 122 Fed. 626, 628 (2d Cir. 1903); Comment, 27 VA. L. REv. 1078, 1080
(1941) ; Note, 34 COLUma. L. Rnv. 357 (1934).
The act was not, however, a clear victory for shippers, but a compromise between the
responsibilities urged by shippers and embodied in the Liverpool & Great Western doc-
trine and the less stringent requirements urged by carriers. See Green, The Harter Act,
16 HAumv. L. REv. 157, 159 (1903).
20. If due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy has been exercised, the carrier will
not be liable for damage to goods due to errors in navigation. Harter § 3. This exception
is probably based on the theory that the carrier's primary interest in the ship is sufficient
to induce him to give strictest orders regarding navigation and thus excuse him from any
complicity in such situations.
21. This approach results in lengthy and technical bills of lading because carriers
attempt to relieve themselves of liability for all the various types of damage not caused
by their fault for which such relief is permissible.
22. Harter §§ 1 & 2.
23. This is the necessary implication from Harter's voiding only clauses exculpating
from negligence.
19641
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
COGSA, passed in 1936 and based upon a uniform act drafted by the Hague
Convention of 1924,2 has much the same rationale as Harter and Liverpool
& Great Western, but is largely drafted in positive terms.25 The parties' rela-
tions are dearly fixed by the statute, no contractual stipulation being necessary
to abrogate the common law strict liability 26 during the tackle-to-tackle por-
tion of sea-voyages to which it applies. 27 Thus, during this time, the carrier
is always liable for the consequences of his negligence (except in navigation)
and never liable for non-negligent damage or damage due to errors in navi-
gation.28 COGSA specifically leaves Harter in effect during the pre- and post-
tackle periods.2 9
Since the accident in Caterpillar took place after the goods had left the
ship's tackles, the affirmative terms of COGSA no longer applied of their own
force.30 Within the limits set by Harter, the parties were free to structure
their responsibilities. One clause in the American Export bill sought to prevent
entirely Harter's application after the goods had left the ship, by defining dis-
charge as complete delivery.31 Were this clause effective to define "proper
delivery" under Harter, the carrier could transfer to the shipper all risk of
subsequent damage.3 2
The Second Circuit's negative response to this term of the contract was
grounded in an appreciation of the adhesionary relationship between shippers
and carriers which had led Congress to enact Harter originally.33 To allow
carriers to define the time at which "proper delivery" occurred would be to
deprive shippers of the protection Congress intended them to have under the
24. See Comment, 27 VA. L. Rxv. 1078 (1941).
25. See GnimoRE & BLAck, THE LAw OF ADmRLTY 123-24 (1957); Comment, 27
VA. L. RFm. 1078 (1941).
26. See COGSA § 4(2) (q).
27. COGSA § 7.
28. See COGSA §§ 3 & 4. See generally GHmoRE & BLAcx, op. cit. supra note 25,
cl. 3; KNAUTH, THE AmERcAN LAW or OCEAx BILLS OF LADmN 163-71 (1953);
Comment, 27 VA. L. REv. 1078 (1941) ; Note, 23 VA. L. Rxv. 590 (1937).
29. COGSA § 12.
30. COGSA § 7. A contrary argument, when goods are still being loaded onto the
lighter, has been sustained when interpreting the British COGSA, Goodwin Ferreira &
Co. v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 34 Lloyd's List L.R. 192 (1929), and has been given some
credence in American courts, Hoegh Lines v. Green Truck Sales, Inc., 298 F.2d 240
(1962), reversing, 179 F. Supp. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1960); Remington Rand Co. v. American
Export Lines, 132 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But the construction has not generally
found favor in American courts. Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, 113 F. Supp.
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Note, 23 MODERN L. REv. 564 (1960). The court specifically
declined to rule on, this point in Caterpillar, saying, correctly in view of its disposition
of the contractual clauses under Harter, that it made no difference which Act applied.
31. American Export Bill of Lading, Clause 4.
32. After proper delivery the carrier owes no positive duties to the goods, so that
he would have no duty to provide a seaworthy lighter. See, e.g., North Amer. Smelting
Co, v. Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1953).
33. See-note 19 supra.
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Harter Act just because carriers could force such exculpatory clauses upon
them. If those protections were to be meaningful, carriers could not define in
their contracts the jurisdictional terms upon which application of the act de-
pended. 34
In the context of judicial development of "proper delivery" under the
common law and Harter, the Second Circuit was correct in finding that proper
delivery had not occurred. Under established doctrine, proper delivery could
be made by delivering the goods into the possession of the consignee or by
placing the cargo on a fit wharf in the port of destination, separating the goods
from the goods of other shippers, and notifying the consignee.3 5 These rules
and the common exceptions to them-for example, that delivery to customs
officials, where required, will suffice 6-seem rooted in a common rationale
34. See, e.g., Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F2d 486 (1961),
aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962). The Ninth Circuit, while advancing
substantially the same argument as the Second Circuit in Caterpillar, relied also on the
concept that when carriage to a port is contracted, delivery to lighters in the harbor can-
not discharge the entire obligation. 300 F.2d at 45. Globe Distributing Co. v. S.S. Monte
Iciar, 1948 Am. Mar. Cas. 615 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Morris v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 54 F.2d
925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd per curiam, 57 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1932). But cf. The Portu-
guese Prince, 209 Fed. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); John Bonura & Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
162 La. 53, 110 So. 86 (1926); Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, 113 F. Supp.
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), where American Export's clause 4 was found to terminate the
contractual relationship between the parties and consequently to foreclose the application
of that part of the stipulation for COGSA pertaining to the statute of limitations. Thus
resulted in carrier liability under the general maritime law, with its longer statute of
limitations.
35. See, e.g., The Eddy, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 481, 495 (1866) (the leading case);
North Amer. Smelting Co. v. Moller S.S. Co, 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1953); Baltimore
& Ohio RR v. United States, 201 F.2d 795, 797 n.3 (3d Cir. 1953); The Italia, 187
F. 113 (2d Cir. 1911).
36. Tan Hi v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 432, 435 (N.D. Cal. 1950); The Milwaukee
Bridge, 15 F2d 249, 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1926). This exception grows out of the more general
exception that delivery may always be made in accordance with port custom or regula-
tion. See, e.g., The Tangier, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 28, 38-39 (1859) ; Constable v. National
S.S. Co., 154 U.S. 51, 63 (1894). It might have been argued that, since lighterage was
customary in the port of Tripoli, delivery had been completed when the goods were
placed on the lighter. But even The Tangier, supra, does not appear to stand for that
result. And any doubt in that regard should be laid to rest by Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam
Cotton Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 386, 391 (1860), where the Court recognized the ex-
ception propounded in The Tangier but held the carrier liable when a lighter hired by
him in accordance with port custom blew up while transporting goods to the ship. The
argument is further contradicted by the many cases where carriers have been held liable
for damage during lighterage, for lighterage is undertaken almost exclusively where it is
the custom of the port. See, e.g., Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp.,
290 F.2d 486 (1961), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962); Colton v. New
York & Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 27 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1928) ; The Ogeechee, 248 Fed. 803
(E.D. Pa. 1918).
The doctrine that the carrier may terminate his carrier liability when the goods are
discharged from the vessel may also appear to furnish an exception, to the rule of re-
sponsibility until the goods are placed on a wharf. But this means only that the carrier
1964]
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of control. Where it is the carrier or his agents who have physical control of
the goods, the doctrine of proper delivery works to place responsibility on the
carrier, as the party best able to avoid negligent damage to the goods.37 Al-
location of risk to the party best able to avoid its fruition is in general the
distribution sought by Harter and COGSA, and the result accomplished by
Caterpillar.38
Since the Harter Act was held to apply to the situation involved, court
interest focused on a second contract stipulation: a term attempting to struc-
ture the distribution of risks of lighterage by a specific clause placing "all
lighterage and use of craft in discharging. . . at the risk and expense of the
[shipper]." 39 Because of lower court findings in Caterpillar, the clause was
viewed as exculpating the carrier from all liability, even for negligence; con-
sequently, the Court of Appeals found it plainly prohibited by Harter.4 0 Nor-
mally, however, such stipulations have been upheld, on the ground that they
may terminate his common-law absolute liability upon discharge from the ship. See
KHAuTH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 145; POOR, AmERIcAN LAW OF CHARTER PARTIES AND
BILLs OF LADING 140 (4th ed. 1954). See also Smith v. Britain S.S. Co., 123 Fed. 176
(S.D.N.Y. 1903); Insurance Co. of N. Amer. v. North German Lloyd Co., 106 Fed. 973
(D. Md. 1900).
37. The doctrines of permissible proper delivery to a wharf, to the consignee or his
agents, or to customs officials are all consistent with this rationale and the cases estab-
lishing and applying these doctrines bear out the underlying concept of control. See, e.g.,
Isthmian S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d 486 (1961), aff'd on rehear-
ing, 300 F.2d 41 (9th Cir. 1962) (see note 34 supra); North Amer. Smelting Co. v.
Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1953) (carrier had fulfilled duty while goods were
in his control; damage occurred afterward) ; Globe Distributing Co. v. S.S. Monte Iciar,
1948 Am. Mar. Cas. 615 (3d Cir. 1948) (carrier, liable, had effective control although
damage might have occurred after the goods were on the wharf) ; Colton v. New York
& Cuba Mail S.S. Co., 27 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1928) (carrier liable in transshipment light-
erage) ; Vitelli v. Cunard S.S. Co., 203 Fed. 697 (2d Cir. 1913) (carrier responsible for
goods discharged onto open pier) ; Smith v. Booth, 122 Fed. 626 (2d Cir. 1903) (trans-
shipment); The Ogeechee, 248 Fed. 803 (E.D. Pa. 1918) (lighter hired by carrier);
Insurance Co. of N. Amer. v. North German Lloyd Co., 106 Fed. 973 (D. Md. 1900)
(lighter hired by carrier). The contrary may be implied from, but is not a necessary
result of, language in Federal Ins. -Co. v. American Export Lines, 113 F. Supp. 540
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); The Portuguese Prince, 209 Fed. 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); John Bonura
& Co. v. United Fruit Co., 162 La. 53, 110 So. 86 (1926).
Control is even more obviously the crucial factor in cases where damage occurred
before the goods had reached the ship. See, e.g., Bulkley v. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co.,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 386 (1860); Mackey v. United States (The Yoro), 83 F. Supp. 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197 F2d 241 (2d Cir. 1952) ; Palmer v. Agwilines, Inc., 135 F.2d
689 (2d Cir. 1943) ; Morris v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 54 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd
mern., 57 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1932).
38. See notes 19 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
39. American Export Bill of Lading, clause 12.
40. The District Court and both parties appear to have assumed that the clause
would exculpate from negligence and the Second Circuit consequently thought the ques-
tion foreclosed.
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do not exculpate for negligence and hence are not prohibited by Harter.41
Under the common law and Harter such stipulations are said to shift the bur-
den of proof of carrier negligence to the shipper as well as to exonerate the
carrier for non-negligent damage.42
The final relevant stipulation in the contract-one honored without discus-
sion by the Second Circuit-stated that COGSA should govern throughout
the contractual period, where not inconsistent with specific stipulations. 43 Such
stipulations for the application of COGSA, while not much before the courts,
appear to be increasingly common, for they offer parties a desirable uniform-
ity of applicable law during the contractual period. 44 One obvious limitation
to the effect of such stipulations is that they may apply only through Harter.
They can neither abrogate nor condition Harter's application to the post- or
pre-tackle period, nor validly introduce a condition forbidden by Harter to
bills of lading.45 Thus, COGSA's limitation of application to the tackle-to-
tackle period must be read as not intended or applicable as part of the stip-
ulated statutory material. On the other hand, all but one of the substantive
provisions of COGSA 46 provide for carrier liability in the event of negligence,
41. This construction does not appear to accord with the natural meaning of the
clause but the overwhelming weight of precedent supports it. See, e.g., Bulkley v. Naum-
keag Steam Cotton Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 386 (1860); North Amer. Smelting Co. v.
Moller S.S. Co., 204 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1953); Morris v. Lamport & Holt, Ltd., 54 F.2d
925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931), aff'd ine2n., 57 F.2d 1081 (2d Cir. 1932). But see Isthmian S.S.
Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d 486 (1961), aff'd on rehearing, 300 F.2d
41 (9th Cir. 1962).
42. The shipper has the initial burden of showing damage while the goods were in
the carrier's custody but such a showing is sufficient to render the carrier liable unless
he brings forward a permissible exculpatory clause which applies to the situation. This
will place the burden of showing negligence on the shipper. If the shipper proves that
part of the damage was occasioned by negligence, the carrier will be liable for all of the
damage unless he can demonstrate what part of the loss was not due to his negligence.
See, e.g., Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 (1934); Clark v. Barnwell, 53 U.S.
(12 How.) 272 (1851) ; The Ponce, 67 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D.N.J. 1946), aff'd per curiam,
160 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1947); Copco Steel & Engr Co. v. S.S. Alwaki, 131 F. Supp.
332 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see Globe Distrib. Co. v. S.S. Monte Iciar, 1948 Am. Mar.
Cas. 615, 620 (3d Cir. 1948) (O'Connell, J., dissenting).
43. American Export Bill of Lading, clause 1.
44. See note 48 infra. And see, e.g., Remington-Rand, Inc. v. American, Export
Lines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export
Lines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
45. See COGSA § 12; KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 167-68.
46. COGSA § 4(2) (a) provides that the carrier shall not be liable for damage due
to negligence in navigation. Harter § 3, however, exculpates the carrier for negligence
in navigation only when due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy has been undertaken.
See May v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packetfahrt Aktiengesellschaft (The Isis), 290
U.S. 333 (1933), which thus construed Harter § 3 and, it is said [KxAuTH, op. cit. supra
note 28, at 167; Comment, 27 VA. L. REv. 1078 (1941)'], speeded the passage of
COGSA. See also Note, 47 HARV. L. Rv. 715 (1934). In a case where damage was due
tu negligence in navigation and due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel had not been
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and so would be readily permissible as stipulations under Harter; the excep-
tion is not important, and ought not affect the overall validity of the stip-
ulation.47 Rather, the stipulation can be interpreted as a shorthand manner
of stipulating COGSA's individual clauses.48 This, in fact, was the interpreta-
tion the Second Circuit seemed to place upon the contract, in finding that the
parties had effectively stipulated for CO GSA's section 4(2) (q).
Complications would arise if a contract containing a lighterage clause in-
terpreted to exculpate only for non-negligence also contained a stipulation,
as in Caterpillar, that COGSA apply throughout the carrier's custody of the
goods. COGSA's burden of proof is one of the components of that act which
can be stipulated in place of Harter. There are differences between the two
burdens-under Harter an exculpatory clause normally shifts the burden of
showing negligence to the shipper 49 while COGSA 4(2) (q) would place the
burden of showing non-negligence on the carrier.50 Of course, being more
favorable to the shipper, the COGSA burden is a permissible stipulation under
Harter.51 But the question of which applies is far from academic. These two
clauses often appear together,52 and the burden of proof is often conclusive 53
because of the shipper's difficulty in bringing evidence of negligence while the
goods are in the carrier's custody. The problem is further complicated by the
fact that COGSA is often stipulated "except as ... otherwise provided." 4
Since the court held the lighterage clause void in Caterpillar, it did not
reach the question whether placement of the burden on the shipper was
"otherwise specifically provided." Some aid in resolving the question is given
by a footnote in which the court intimated that properly drafted clauses would
have shifted the burden to the shipper. 5 Where there is no mention of the
burden of proof, however, it is doubtful that such a clause is present. In
answering questions of the extent to which the carrier is exculpated, the
undertaken, the stipulation for COGSA could exculpate for negligently caused damage.
It would thus be void and impossible of application to this limited situation.
47. Gi'ORE & BLAcK, op. cit. supra note 25, at 127; KNAUTH, op. Cit. upra note
28, at 167. Cf. Mackey v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 197
F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1952) (COGSA applied without question where stipulated) ; Isthmian
S.S. Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 290 F.2d 486, 493 (1961), aff'd on rehearing,
300 F.2d 41, 49 (9th Cir. 1962) (Pope, J., concurring).
48. But cf. Federal Ins. Co. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.
N.Y. 1953) (finding the stipulation for COGSA a general clause controlled by other
clauses considered specific).
49. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Schroeder Bros. v. The Saturnia, 226 F.2d 147, 149 (2d Cir. 1955);
George F. Pettinos, Inc. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 759, 761 (E.D. Pa.
1946), aff'd per curiam, 159 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1947).
51. See Harter § 1. It is not possible that a stipulation which favors the shipper
could exculpate the carrier for negligence.
52. See notes 44 and 48 supra.
53. See Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296, 306 (1934).
54. See note 44 supra.
55. 318 F.2d at 720, 724.
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policy of strict construction against carriers 56 should be effectuated. Carrier
stipulations which shift the burden of proof to the shipper themselves act as
exculpatory clauses."7 Thus, as long as proper delivery has not been made-
and the goods remain in the predominant control of the carrier-it seems
more reasonable to place the cautionary effect of the burden on the carrier.
If carriers may be expected to dominate the bargaining process no matter
what statutory structure is adopted (at least in the detail of risk allocation),
it would appear that COGSA's positive law approach is preferable to Har-
ter's permissive one.5 The problem is not one of contractual intent, but of
who should be primarily responsible for insurance-what system will operate
best to protect the goods. COGSA is a far more precise formulation of
privileges and immunities. It not only simplifies modem bills of lading, much
of which are occupied with allocating the responsibilities of the parties before
and after the carriage by sea, but also applies more consistently the principle
that carriers should be liable for the consequences of their negligence while
the goods are within their control.5
While the principle suggested has been developed in the realm of contract
interpretation, it must be recognized that it goes much deeper. There is no
sound reason of policy for applying two acts to different portions of a con-
tinuous carriage arrangement.60 By their stipulations for COGSA, carriers
seem to have recognized and sought the benefits of uniformity. The only
plausible explanation why COGSA was limited to the tackle-to-tackle situa-
tion as enacted, is that it was drafted chiefly by nations which had no equiv-
alent to the Harter Act.6 1 The tackle-to-tackle period is the period during
which the carrier is most obviously in control of the goods and, therefore,
the period on which international agreement would be most readily reached;
Congress apparently did not foresee the problems which would result under
American law from the conjuncture of Harter and COGSA.
Although courts will be able to resolve many problems of contract inter-
pretation in the post-tackle period by proceeding from the always applicable
provisions of the Harter Act, they will be unable to achieve the uniformity
the parties seem to desire. 2 To reach this end, COGSA should be amended
56. See note 19 supra.
57. See Globe Distrib. Corp. v. S.S. Monte Iciar, 1948 Am. Mar. Cas. 615, 620 (3d
Cir. 1948) (O'Connell, J., dissenting). Judge O'Connell reasoned that since shifting the
burden of proof to the shipper might prevent a finding of negligence, where there had in
fact been negligence, any clause which thus shifted the burden should be void under § 1
of Harter.
58. See KNAuTH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 167.
59. See notes 19 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
60. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 28, at 167-68.
61. Ibid.
62. While the courts might be able to overcome the complex problems of super-
imposed statutes and conflicting stipulations and thus achieve a type of uniformity, the
need here is for less rather than more contractual freedoms. This is implicit in the more
positive terms of the more recent statute, COGSA, which structures carrier responsibil-
ity in a more uniform and salutary manner.
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to apply throughout the period of carrier control over goods being transp6rted
by sea in foreign commerce-from the time the goods come into the control
of the carrier or his agent until proper delivery has been made. The control
basis of the proper delivery requirement should be explicitly recognized to
make it clear that that requirement seeks to allocate risk to the party best
able to avoid its fruition by his choice, inspection, or care. The primary benc-
fit of the revision would be to impose uniform responsibilities on the carrier
during the entire time that the goods are in his control.
